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Chapter 22 
Nancy Harding 
 
Jacques-Marie-Èmile Lacan 
 
If you’re doing your job and delivering on things it’s almost like it feels like you 
get to a certain point and you get a tap on the shoulder by the organization  ........ 
It’s almost like the organization is taking a view as to when you’re ready for that 
next step every step of the way really. Or it certainly feels like that to me ...  it 
certainly feels like the organization is kind of keeping an eye on me. 
(Middle manager talking about the implementation of talent management, in 
Harding, Lee and Ford [in review]) 
What is this ‘organization’ that can both keep an eye on managers and tap them on the 
shoulder? To this speaker it appears to be an independent, anthropomorphised entity. In 
this chapter I explore the contribution of Lacanian theory to understanding how speaker 
and this (seeming) entity with an eye and a finger co-emerge. Lacanian theory illuminates  
how the unconscious and ‘organization’ are  inevitably and caught up in each other. 
Lacan took Freud’s theories, subjected them to an inspirational re-reading, and thus 
contributed in a major way to poststructuralist theory. 
Organization studies (OS) came late to reading Lacan compared with other disciplines, 
but a substantial and growing body of work now interprets various aspects of 
organizational life through a Lacanian lens. These include, for example, studies of 
entrepreneurship (Jones and Spicer, 2005); identity (Driver, 2009); power and resistance 
(Roberts, 2005); embodied subjectivity (Driver, 2008), envy (Vidaillet, 2007); 
organizational burnout (Vanheule and Verhaeghe, 2004; Vanheule et al., 2003); 
organizational dynamics (Arnaud, 2002); public administration (McSwite, 1997; Fotaki, 
2009). A special issue of the journal Organization (2010) applied Lacanian ideas of 
desire, enjoyment and lack to organizational issues; an edited book explores Lacan in 
more depth (Cederstrom and Hoedemaekers, [Eds.] 2010). Finally, there has been a 
limited application of Lacan’s thesis on gender (Kenny, 2009; Fotaki and Harding, 2012).  
There has as yet been little exploration of the potential of Lacanian theory for process 
theories of organizations (see Harding, 2007, for an early attempt).   
Feminist and Marxist theorists were the first to use Lacanian ideas in the English-
speaking world. Zizek’s interpretation, popular in Lacanian organization studies, is the 
most influential reading in Marxist-Lacanian theory. My own interest in Lacan’s work 
was stimulated by Judith Butler’s guarded and critical application of his work to her 
thesis on the performative constitution of the (gendered) subject (1990; 1993).  I therefore 
approached Lacan via gender theorists’ interpretations, readings that deviate in some 
important ways from those inspired by Zizek. My understanding of Lacan therefore has a 
somewhat different focus from that of scholars schooled in a Zizekian interpretation, in 
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which the concept of the phallus is largely conspicuous by its (apparent) absence. 
Lacanian organization theory is influenced largely by his notions of 
lack/desire/jouissance, with the three registers of the Symbolic, Imaginary and the Real 
influential to a greater or lesser extent (these are defined and discussed below). Feminist 
interpretations are dominated by Lacan’s theory of sexuation (Lacan, 1982; 1998a), the 
Gaze (of the Other) (see, especially, the seminal (sic) paper by Laura Mulvey, 1975) and, 
of course, a critique of his (seeming) elevation of the Phallus (see Fotaki and Harding, 
2013, for a discussion) to the position of that which determines what can and cannot be 
spoken. There is much in feminist readings of Lacan that is yet to be taken up by 
organization theorists, such as his five theses on aggression (see Brennan, 1993).  
It is perhaps not surprising that Lacanian theorists should find different lode-bearing 
seams in his work because his style of argumentation was obscure and open to multiple 
interpretations. His seminars (in contrast to his Ecrits) come to us via notes and 
summaries made by listeners; his ideas evolved throughout his long career; and Lacan 
was not consistent in the use of his own terms. Most importantly, Lacan aimed to explore 
unconscious wishes and desires that are, by definition, outside of language: how then can 
they be described in language? Lacan’s answer was that language should echo in some 
ways the manner in which the unconscious functions, hence his use of a convoluted style 
of writing, one that is ‘psychotic’ (Benvenuto and Kennedy, 1986), and full of puns, 
obscure or hidden references, double meanings and so on. He wished that this style would 
encourage listeners and readers to engage with a text as if in a therapy session where  
limitations of meaning are confronted.  Thus to read Lacan requires that one explore the 
effect the language has upon the self as it reads (Homer, 2005) and thus engage in an 
intense reflection upon the self.  
Relatedly, to use Lacan’s name as a fount of authority is to contradict Lacan’s teachings 
concerning, variously, the name-of-the-Father 1 , the subject-supposed-to-know 2 , the 
discourses of the university and the master 3 , the phallus’s 4  claim to be the master 
signifier, and so on. We must not claim to be a ‘true’ interpreter of his texts because that 
would be to attempt to dictate what knowledge is and what can be knowable. Lacan 
warned against such an endeavour.                                                         1 A symbolic position of authority and the (symbolic) law. The law is something we desire to transgress, and it is that desire which is the precondition for the law itself.   2 The person who supposedly has absolute and certain knowledge of one’s innermost secrets.  3 In Seminar XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Lacan (2007) outlines the schemata of four discourses constitutive of the social order: the university, master, hysteric and analyst. These produce the four fundamental social effects of educating/indoctrinating; governing/brainwashing; desiring/protesting and analyzing/revolutionizing (Bracher, 1994). 4 The phallus should not be confused with the penis: it is a privileged signifier that inaugurates the process of signification and anchors the chain of signification. It is fundamental to lack, in that it signifies an object of desire that we have lost and constantly search for, although we actually never had it in the first place.  
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What follows therefore must be a singular interpretation, one that inevitably says as much 
about the chapter’s author as she attempts to say about Lacan. Marianna Fotaki and I 
have explored feminist interpretations of Lacan in a paper whose first version railed 
against Lacanian organization theorists’ attempt dictate a singular reading and thus to 
wield for themselves the power of the phallus (the master signifier, that dictates what is 
speakable). Wise reviewers pointed out that we were doing that very thing ourselves, i.e. 
dictating how Lacan should be read. To avoid this we found we needed to occupy the 
position of the hysteric5 (Fotaki and Harding, 2012). This chapter therefore is avowedly 
hysterical, a hysteria arising in part from having to use the discourses of the master and 
the university (‘this is how Lacan must be read’) in order to write about Lacan for an 
Oxford Handbook.  
I will next give a brief overview of Lacan’s life, provide a somewhat superficial summary 
of his work, and then delve more deeply into some of the major aspects of his oeuvre. 
That returns us to the speaker whose words opened this chapter, who speaks for all of us 
in our desire to be recognised by a fantasised Other upon which we put the label 
‘organization’. I use a reflexive perspective, exploring how working on this paper co-
constitutes both self and ‘university’, that is, two ‘fluid, amorphous, social phenomena in 
space-time’ that are ‘an indistinguishable mass of vague interactions and experiences’ 
(Chia, 1998:4) operating at both conscious and unconscious levels.     
Lacan: a Masculine Speaking Subject 
Jacques-Marie-Èmile Lacan (1901-1981) was a hugely controversial Parisian 
psychoanalyst who attracted both adulation and loathing, and scandal and crisis. He was 
regarded by some as a guru and by others as a charlatan. From a comfortable, middle-
class, Catholic background, he developed a passion for philosophy while still at school. 
Trained as a psychiatrist, in the 1930s he encountered both surrealism and the works of 
Sigmund Freud; their joint influence led him to profoundly change his work. Presumed to 
be politically left-wing, he voiced support for the student demonstrations of 1968 but 
later warned that revolutions led to nothing more than the replacement of one master with 
another.  
Lacan’s work is often divided between the early phase (up to 1953) and a mature phase 
from 1953 until his death. It was in 1953 that Lacan was elected president of the Societe 
Francaise de Psychanalyse (SPF), and in the same year he started giving the seminars in 
which he outlined his ideas to an audience that eventually grew to 1000 participants and 
included intellectual celebrities. In 1963 Lacan was banned from the SPF, which wanted 
membership of the International Psychoanalytic Association, a desire that could be 
fulfilled only if the controversial Lacan was removed. He founded his own study group 
that grew to become the L’Ecole Freudienne de Paris, and at the invitation of Louis 
Althusser set up a base at Ecole Normal Superieure. Always controversial, but hugely 
                                                        5 The hysteric’s discourse is that of a subject who refuses to take up the positions available to her/him through language even though desiring to occupy those very subject positions it refuses 
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popular, he dissolved L’Ecole in 1980 because, in his view, it had become too Lacanian 
and had lost its Freudian roots.    
Throughout, Lacan followed his aim of returning to Freud, re-reading his works through 
such disciplines as philosophy (notably Plato, Kant, Hegel and Heidegger), mathematics, 
and, most influentially, anthropology (Levi-Strauss) and linguistics (Saussure). 
Saussure’s influence led to Lacan’s best-known formula that ‘The unconscious is 
structured as a language’ (Zizek, 2006:3). The unconscious, in this formulation, is not the 
repository of irrational instincts but something that talks and thinks, using its own 
grammar and logic (ibid). It is not located ‘inside’ individuals but is the effect upon  
subjects of a trans-individual symbolic order  (Homer, 2004:69).   
How may management and organization theorists approach Lacan: as a psychoanalyst or 
a philosopher? We undoubtedly cannot use his ideas to undertake therapy with/in 
organizations, but we can use his ideas theoretically (Frosh, 2010), as a form of ‘wild 
philosophy’ (Bond, 2009), or indeed as a historian of the ego’s era (Brennan, 1993). 
Lacan qua philosopher explores how ‘reality’ is constituted, notably through the effects 
of speech and language on the human condition (Nobus, 2000:xiii).  
For Nobus (2000), Lacan’s work has a global theoretical framework that must be 
understood before any of the other aspects of his writings can be grasped. I will firstly, 
writing from the position of the hysteric, summarise this framework in the form of a story. 
One cannot sustain one’s self within only one of Lacan’s four discourses: later in the 
paper I will inevitably circle back through the discourses of the master and the university 
– attempting to dictate how Lacan should be understood (Fotaki and Harding, 2012). 
The everyday tragedy of being a subject: a Lacanian (Bad Fairy) Tale 
A baby is born. It is nothing but a sea of consciousness (J. Klein, 1987) filled with 
demands, dread and desires. It does not recognise that its care-takers are separate 
from itself, it is unaware of any boundaries to its body, even that it has a body. All 
there is are sensations. (Let’s call this the Real: a place outside language, where 
there are no signifiers, signifieds or signs.) Slowly, slowly, it starts to identify the 
linkages between signifier, signified and sign – it is entering the Symbolic, where 
signs and symbols exist that allow objects to be named. But there is as yet no 
sense of self, no boundaries between a not-yet-emerged ‘I/me’ and others. Until 
one day, the child, perhaps struggling to pull itself to its feet, sees its image 
reflected in a mirror or in another person’s face and recognises itself. That is 
ME!!! There is jubilation. I exist as an I. But of course that I does not exist – it is 
a mirror image, a not-me. But the child imagines it is an I or a me. This is the 
Imaginary: I believe I am a whole person; that there is an ‘I’ that exists. This is a 
sexed I or me – but the sex that I am is imposed on me from outside, and I have to 
learn how to constitute a self that can pass as a male or a female speaking subject. 
But the subject is troubled: that ‘me’ is outside ‘me’ (in the mirror) so who 
therefore is in here, inside, who is this I? What happened to that wonderful sense, 
before I had language, that I was complete, whole? Now begins a life-long 
process of desiring something I can never find, something I lost when I entered 
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the Symbolic even though I had not possessed it before losing it, and whose 
absence leaves me with a fundamental sense of lack. I know neither what I desire 
nor what I lack, I know only a constant, unquenchable desire for something I must 
seek, my objet petit a6. But the purpose of my desire is desire itself, because 
without a desire that propels me forward I cease to exist. 
I thus work at constructing a self, one that consists of an ideal ego or the self I 
would like to be, but I also construct an ego-ideal, a big Other7, that I try to 
impress. I always fail in this endeavour of impressing that Other because of the 
intervention of my superego, or the Other in its revengeful, sadistic and punishing 
aspect. I try to please it but do not know what it wants. I am judged: a voice 
constantly whispers in my ear, coming at me from outside, from the big Other, 
that tells me how inadequate I am.  I desire to be a fantasised, imaginary, ideal 
self, but I am a subject linked to the symbolic so I can never be that person I yearn 
to be.   
This Lacanian tale is of a subject that ceaselessly works on itself to construct a self that is 
impossible to construct. It has many affinities with process theories of organizations: we 
see fantasised selves in fantasised locations. This is where I, as hysteric, come up against 
myself. I recognise that ‘the organization’ has no existence as such, but at the same time I 
desire its recognition of me so that I can know of my own  existence.  
But the ratchet turns and the hysteric is overcome by the Master and the University – 
rather than outlining a bad fairy tale, I turn now to exploring in a more ‘philosophical’ 
way some major aspects of Lacan’s work. For each, I will explore one ‘seminal’ paper 
from organization studies that relates Lacan’s ideas to organizations. 
The three registers of the Imaginary, Symbolic and the Real 
Lacan’s early work focused on the Imaginary, his attention switching to the Symbolic in 
the decade following delivery of the Rome Report in 1953, with the Real a third term 
whose role and definition changed over the years. Although ‘profoundly heterogenous’ 
they were linked together by Lacan in a seminar in 1974/5 (Sheridan, Translator’s Note, 
in Lacan, 1998b).  
The Imaginary 
                                                        6 Objet petit a is, in Homer’s words (2004:87), that sense upon achieving our goals, that there is always something more that we should have experienced but we do not know what it is. The objet petit a is not that object; it is the function that masks the lack. 7 For Lacan, the big Other is the symbolic order, that always-already there to which I  must conform if I am to have being. The unconscious is the effect of the symbolic order upon the subject. The little other (lower case ‘o’) refers to other people: we presume that they are unified, coherent and whole but because every subject is a subject of lack, other people are imaginary others. 
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The imaginary register is first encountered in the ‘mirror stage’ of the child’s 
development, but continues to inform subjectivities throughout life. The mirror stage is 
an ‘identification’, that is, ‘the transformation that takes place in a subject when he 
assumes an image’ (Lacan, 1977:2). Only seven pages long, this lecture is worth 
exploring in depth. 
Lacan discusses a young infant who cannot yet walk, stand or even sit up unaided, and 
who, unaware of a body as such and thus incapable of motor coordination, feels animated 
by turbulent movements. But the infant sees its reflection and experiences jubilation as it 
recognises its self as an I. This form would have to be called the Ideal-I, Lacan writes 
(1977:2) but  
‘this form situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a 
fictional direction, which will always remain irreducible for the individual alone, 
or rather, which will only rejoin the coming-into-being) (le devenir) of the subject 
asymptotically, whatever the success of the dialectical syntheses by which he 
must resolve as I his discordance with his own reality’ (p.2). 
That is, the image reflected back at the infant is a fictional one – giving the impression of 
a whole, coordinated subject with which the infant can identify, an impression that belies 
the infant’s then reality (she cannot stand unaided). This fiction or ‘mirage’ of a whole 
self will inform the subject throughout its life. Importantly, the infant has found itself 
outside its self, in a form that is ‘certainly more constituent than constituted’ (p.2). This 
Gestalt, this mirage, ‘symbolizes the mental permanence of the I, at the same time as it 
prefigures its alienating destination’ (p.2) within a  
‘temporal dialectic [that] decisively projects the formation of the individual into 
history. The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from 
insufficiency to anticipation – and which manufactures for the subject, caught up 
in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from 
a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic – 
and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will 
mark with its rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development’ (1977: 4).   
At the end of the mirror stage the ‘specular I’ is deflected into the ‘social I’ (Lacan, 
1977:5), inaugurating ‘a dialectic that will henceforth link the I to socially elaborated 
situations’ (Lacan, 1977:5). Hegel’s master/slave dialectic is influential here: the specular 
I seeks acknowledgement of itself ‘through the desire of the other’ (p.5) (that is, it seeks 
the reliving of that inaugurative jubilation when it first recognised itself), but because this 
I is alienated, is outside itself, it is aggressive to the other (p.6) because of an ‘imaginary 
servitude’ to the other (p.7).    
Exemplary in organization studies’ use of the Imaginary is perhaps Roberts’ (2005) thesis 
that through the Imaginary I identify both with the gaze of the Other that (I imagine) 
looks at me, and the self I imagine myself to be. The Imaginary instigates that desire for 
control (over the other) that informs managerial practices. This is because ‘the narcissistic 
identification with the gaze of the other – the seeking and finding of myself in the gaze of 
the other – serves as an explanation of the dynamics of both love and aggression’ (p. 631). 
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I need the desire of the other if I am to exist, but because I am dependent on that gaze I 
also hate that desire.  With regard to organizations, Roberts suggests we have a fantasised 
organizational ideal that we cannot live up to, so we berate ourselves: ‘The ideal provides 
the ground with which conscience can be turned aggressively back upon the self’ (p. 636). 
This is the very organization to which we look for recognition, and thus selfhood, so to 
feel ourselves denied that recognition is to feel despair. It necessitates a ‘strong interest’ 
in controlling both self and others, such that the social becomes a ‘domain solely of a 
struggle for control in the interests of the ego’ (p. 637). We are thus vulnerable to 
organizational mechanisms of disciplinary power. Only through letting go of the ego, of 
the self we are striving to be(come), can we resist organizational demands. 
At its simplest level, the organization, in the Imaginary, can be regarded as a fantasy that 
has great power over the subject. As a fantasy it exists only in the psyche, but in that 
location it allows identification and making of an agonistic self. 
The Symbolic 
In contrast to Lacan’s neat summary of the imaginary in one lecture, his development  of 
the theory of the Symbolic is dotted throughout several seminars beginning with the 
Rome seminar of 1953 (Lacan, 1999). Now the influence of Levi-Strauss and Saussure 
are palpable.  Frustration follows any desire to summarise ‘the Symbolic’ or grasp its 
meaning: the Rome seminar is long and discursive. But let us start at p. 65, where Lacan 
states that ‘it is the world of words that creates the world of things’, so that ‘Man speaks, 
then, but it is because the symbol has made him man’. A discussion of the laws of kinship 
and reference to the Oedipus complex then leads Lacan to write that ‘what the subject can 
know of his unconscious participation in the movement of the complex structures of 
marriage ties, by verifying the symbolic effects in his individual existence of the 
tangential movement towards incest that has manifested itself ever since the coming of a 
universal community’ (66). This leads to a statement on p. 67 that ‘It is in the name of the 
father that we must recognize the support of the symbolic function which, from the dawn 
of history, has identified this person with the figure of the law’ (emphasis in original). He 
points out that the subject would be ‘annihilated’ under the weight of such huge pressures 
‘if desire did not preserve its part in the interferences and pulsations that the cycles of 
language cause to converge on him’ (68). Such that 
‘what is at stake in an analysis is the advent in the subject of that little reality that 
this desire sustains in him with respect to the symbolic conflicts and imaginary 
fixations as the means of their agreement’ …. // From this point on it will be seen 
that the problem is that of the relations between speech and language in the 
subject’ (68). 
In a few brief passages Lacan therefore specifies language as symbols that constitute 
subjects within historico-cultural settings, but these are subjects necessarily driven by 
desire that is not only instigated by the symbolic but will sustain that symbolic. An added 
complication is the distinction between speech and language. I could spend this entire 
chapter analysing these four pages, especially as (for current purposes) they hint at ways 
in which to understand how individuals are caught up in the propulsion that constitutes 
‘the organization’.  No doubt my interpretation would differ from other readers – the  
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quotes given illuminate the struggles and intellectual frissons experienced when 
attempting to engage with Lacan’s work, but also how Lacan’s language is mimetic of an 
analytical encounter - we have to do hard work in order to develop understanding so each 
person’s unconscious influences their reading.  
There is surprisingly little discussion of the Symbolic in Lacanian MOS. Stavrakis (2008) 
discusses it briefly. It is, he writes, a network into which we are born that has a far more 
important structuring role than the imaginary. We must submit to it because only through 
submitting to the laws of language can we become subjects: we inhabit and are inhabited 
by language (p. 1044). The laws of language are symbolic Law, embodied by the Name-
of-the-Father, or the agent of symbolic castration. Castration is that which occurs on 
entering into language – the subject is radically split between a replete-ness, a captivating 
jouissance 8 it experienced outside language, and the never-finished self that emerges 
within the symbolic. But the Other (the symbolic) cannot fulfil that lack, and indeed 
produces it, so the Other is also a lacking Other. However, Stavrakakis (2008) argues, 
subjects are willing to do whatever may be necessary to repress or disavow the lack in the 
Other (1045). Willing to subordinate themselves within conditions of voluntary servitude,  
subjectification within the Symbolic produces organizational subjects riven in two,  
suffering lack, and colluding in their own abjection.   
The Real 
The real, apparent in Lacan’s work in the 1950s, became increasingly important in  
succeeding decades. Its meaning and position shifted until it became the central category 
in Lacan’s late work. Reality and ‘the real’ are very different concepts: ‘reality’ is  
associated with the symbolic order; whereas the real is that unsymbolisable something 
that exists at the symbolic’s limit.  The real both undermines symbolic reality and makes 
it possible. Lacan understood the real in the 1950s as an undifferentiated mass that 
precedes language, but later argued that its being outside the symbolic renders definition  
impossible; suffice it to say that it is associated with trauma, or pain that cannot be put 
into language  (Homer, 2004).  
Related to the real are fantasy, lack and jouissance. Fantasy includes daydreams and  
foundational myths that structure psychic life (e.g. the ‘fact’ of two distinct sexes; the 
‘fact’ that managers and staff are distinct). The subject attempts to cover over its 
constitutive lack through attempts at identification, its desire to be. This negative 
ontology of lack explains why the lacking subject desires its subjection (Stavrakakis, 
2008), an observation of importance for understanding the investment made when 
identifying with organizations. Objet petit a is the left-over of the real: although it 
escapes symbolisation and cannot be represented, it is a feeling that bridges the                                                         8 Stavrikakis (2010) defines jouissance as ‘enjoyment’, contradicting Lacan’s account of something murkier. It is defined elsewhere as ‘a sacrifice made at the altar of more or less obscure gods; it is the malefic jouissance of stripping the other of the goods he holds dear. ….. Jouissance appears in guilt, in remorse, in confession, in contrition, more in paying than in being paid, in destroying more than in conserving (Braunstein, 2003, p. 108)  
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unconscious and the symbolic; it is that thing desired and striven for in the unconscious 
belief that once found we will become whole. A cornerstone of Lacan’s work (Braunstein, 
2003), jouissance is as difficult to define as lack and the real.  To translate it as 
‘enjoyment’ radically simplifies a concept that incorporates pain as much as pleasure, that 
is, pleasure that can be found through pain.   Braunstein, (2003: 104), defining it as ‘a 
“something” lived by a body when pleasure stops being pleasure. It is a plus, a sensation 
that is beyond pleasure’, suggests that jouissance is a letting go of the ego, or, in Hegel’s 
terms, a forgetting of one’s self in the object.  
‘Desire points towards a lost and absent object; it is lack in being, and the craving 
for fulfilment in the encounter with the lost object. Its concrete expression is the 
fantasy. Jouissance, on the other hand, does not point to anything, nor does it 
service any purpose whatsoever; …… [D]esire, phantasy, and pleasure are 
barriers on the way to jouissance.  
Lack and the real have been drawn on in some depth by organization theorists since 
Jones and Spicer’s (2005) paper. Jones and Spicer argue that entrepreneurship discourse 
‘is a paradoxical, incomplete and worm-ridden symbolic structure that posits an 
impossible and indeed incomprehensible object at its centre’ (p.236), and so ‘offers a 
narrative structure to the fantasy that coordinates desire’ (p.237). They argue that this 
impossible desire enlists entrepreneurs and reproduces economic domination (ibid). The 
author whose development of Lacanian lack for organization studies is most fruitful is 
Michaela Driver who, in a series of papers, has attempted to rescue Lacan from his 
profound pessimism. In 2009, for example, she explored lack and identity, arguing that 
although ‘in the end, there is only lack and the ever-present nothingness of work, 
organization, and self …. it is also precisely this lack that holds much potential for 
empowerment and liberation’ (Driver, 2009:57). Organizational identity discourses, she 
argues, are imaginary constructions that invariably fail (p. 65). Because of that failure and 
the revelation of lack that is revealed, subjects are liberated to ‘engage in liberating  
struggles with lack’ (p. 66). That is, they are able to experiment with identities beyond 
those deemed permissible by the organization. Failure to define who we are allows us to 
be alive and creative, she argues powerfully. That is, by resisting identification with the 
organization, we may find spaces of freedom in which to constitute other identities.  
 
Summary: the Lacanian subject in/of organizations 
The Lacanian subject is, in short, a desiring subject for whom satisfaction is impossible, 
but whose search for the lost object that might provide satisfaction propels the subject 
forward. This subject identifies with that which appears to offer the potential to fulfil its 
desire (to be), to overcome its lack. ‘The’ organization is a site where that dialectic of 
desire/lack is articulated, opening the subject to domination by the organizational Big 
Other, albeit that the Organizational Big Other does not exist. In Lacanian terms, ‘the 
organization’ is imaginary; it is ‘a master signifier that draws together a field of 
signification, notwithstanding its own vacuity’ (Owens, 2010, p. 187). The 
Organizational Big Other promises fulfilment of the desire for being, but what is 
experienced is a failure of the self to become the ideal subject that the subject imagines 
s/he is required by the organization to be.   
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That is …. I am sitting in my study in my house in the north of England working on this 
chapter. I seem to be alone, but as I read and write I gesture towards an Organizational 
Big Other for evidence of my identity as ‘academic’. The ‘organization’ takes the shape 
of a fantasised readership of the chapter: I want their approval even though I cannot 
envisage who they might be. The university that pays my salary and provides students I 
try to teach is also here as I type: this chapter will be included in my ‘outputs’ for this 
year and that ‘organization’ therefore informs my thoughts. If I gain their approval I will 
know that I am ‘an academic’. Just like the speaker whose words opened this chapter, I 
am waiting for a tap on the shoulder that says ‘hey, excellent chapter – the best thing yet 
written on Lacan and organizations’. Previous experience has taught me not only how 
futile is this fantasy, but also how everything I write is just not good enough. I write a 
paper or, more rarely, a book, occasionally see one accepted and published, but each time 
that paper or book is not the text I had envisaged: it lacks something, I must keep on 
writing, trying to produce the work that encapsulates what I need to say, one that will 
give me recognition of myself as a successful academic, a great thinker, a fantastic 
interpreter of ideas. I am driven to keep on reading and writing: I read, I write, I answer 
emails, I think. My fantasised university, the ‘object’ to which I refer when I think about 
my job, emerges out of all these activities and those of other employees, just as we 
emerge out of our identities as ‘academics’. I refer to it by a name that performatively 
constitutes it – requiring its existence so that I know of my own existence. By existing as 
employee (‘my identity’) and acting in the required manner, the object of my desire 
appears to be there before me – ‘an’ organization that offers the (fallacious) opportunity 
for wholeness, a filling in of that lack.   Isolated at my desk, the Organizational Big Other 
is threaded within my psyche, part of me just as I am part of ‘it’, that object whose desire 
I require. Just as Lacanian organization theorists have argued that lack drives others in 
pursuit of their desire - to be an entrepreneur, to manage staff, to purchase fashion 
products, etc – so too does lack inform the psyche of the subject who would be an 
academic.  
Before expanding on the implications for process theories of organizations, I must make  
a detour via Lacan’s thesis on gender. 
Lacan and process theories of organizations: a detour via Seminar XX on Feminine 
Sexuality 
Lacan’s understanding of the subject as a being in process that has marked affinities to 
‘the organization’ as process. To paraphrase Lacan’s (1982) notorious statement about 
‘the woman’: there is no such thing as ‘the’ organization, the ‘the’ is barred, its facticity 
is a mirage arising from desire and lack.   Psyches, bodies, places, artefacts, policies, 
rules, and so on, interweave and collapse into each other in an imbrication that seems to 
take place ‘in’ something that is actually produced through that imbrication.  Given that 
gender is fundamental to, in the sense that it precedes, culture (and thus organizations), 
then it is a gendered imbrication of names/selves/objects/places that ‘produce’ gendered 
organizations that ‘produce’ gendered organizational selves. Lacanian organizational 
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process theory therefore requires 9  understanding of how it is that organizations are 
constituted as a masculine Big Other, as places in which emotions must be subordinated 
beneath rationality  (Adler, Laney and Packer, 1993; Mills, 1992). They are places in 
which the (masculine) pervert’s desire for control (Copjec, 2004) is unleashed.  
In psychoanalytical theory, one cannot be unless one accedes to a gendered identity. 
Lacan argued in Seminar XX (1982/1998) that gender is neither biological nor social, but 
is a choice imposed on the subject:  ‘there is nothing by which the subject may situate 
himself as a male or female being’ (Lacan, 1998a: 204). Mitchell and Rose (1982) 
translate Lacan as saying that sexual difference is ‘a legislative divide which creates and 
reproduces its categories’ (1982: 41). In Lacan, Rose and Mitchell (1982: 29) write, we 
see an account of ‘the fictional nature of the sexual category to which every human 
subject is … assigned’. Thus ‘male’ and ‘female’ are notions emerging out of fantasy 
(33). The ‘feminine’, it follows, ‘is constituted as a division in language, a division which 
produces the feminine as its negative term’. If woman is defined as other it is because the 
definition produces her as other. The emancipatory potential of Lacan’s arguments, Rose 
suggests, lies in seeing that the male, like the female, is subjected within the symbolic 
order. Lacan’s work, in this interpretation, exposes the ‘fundamental imposture’ used in 
the subordination of the female (Campbell, 2004). Lacan’s thesis on gender has been 
hotly contested by feminist thinkers (see Fotaki and Harding, 2012, for a discussion), but 
for present purposes the arguments from Seminar XX that gender is not determined but is 
fluid and flexible, and that male and female speaking subjects need not necessarily have 
male or female biology, is sufficient to inform the present discussion. 
A (but not ‘the’) Lacanian process theory of organizations: from the hysteric to 
the (perverted) master 
What is striking in much Lacanian organization studies is an absence of reflexivity, 
despite his admonition (noted above) that to read his texts is to engage in self-analysis.  
As Woźniak (2010:396) puts it, researchers ‘who apply psychoanalysis are also its 
subject and as such they become an effect of language, distinct from a biological 
individual’. Authors use Lacan, for example, to theorise the absence of resistance towards 
management, yet do not ask themselves if the desire for evidence of resistance is their 
desire projected onto a fantasised other – ‘the workforce’. To explore lack is to 
interrogate one’s own lack, surely? Should not we who attempt to interpret organizations 
through a Lacanian lens acknowledge ourselves as inevitably implicated in the symbolic, 
imaginary and real? Does our failure to do so reveal that we are attempting not only to 
occupy the place of the master, but also our secret desire to possess the phallus and thus 
to dictate what can be said and thought (the discourse of the university)? That is, in 
reading numerous texts on Lacan while writing this chapter I have hoped they would 
fulfil my illusory desire that I could write a perfect text, one that lacks nothing (a desire 
to fill that hole in my being through writing).  But I have wondered why some papers 
were accepted for publication: couldn’t reviewers see the poverty of application traducing 
of Lacan’s ideas? The ‘why’ bespeaks the position of the hysteric; I want to publish on                                                         9 Note the imperative in this statement – ‘requires’. This is the discourse of the master. 
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Lacan, I want to join this special club but its weaknesses mean it is a club I do not wish to 
join – unless that is I can change the terms of the debate. If so, then I am dictating how to 
approach Lacan: welcome to the house of the master (again). And so the Organizational 
Big Other constitutes ‘me’ even as I constitute ‘it’ through my fantasy of what it requires 
me to do – to cogently critique others’ work even as I build on what they have done. 
In other words, I see in Lacanian organization studies and my own position in writing this 
text a Lacanian process theory of organizations in action.   
To develop this thesis I turn now to another reading of Lacan from gender studies. Freud 
and Lacan turned to Sophocles ancient tragedies for understanding of the modern psyche, 
Freud to Oedipus and Lacan, like many philosophers, to Oedipus’s daughter/sister,  
Antigone.  Copjec (2004) has developed Lacan’s interpretation in a way that can inform 
our understanding of the co-emergence of subject and Organizational Big Other.  
Antigone is the daughter of the incestuous relationship between Oedipus and his mother, 
Jocasta. She breaks a law that the body of her slain brother shall not be buried. 
Discovered, arrested and taken to King Creon, her uncle, she is condemned to the slow 
death of entombment in a cave. Antigone hangs herself, and Creon’s wife and son 
commit suicide as a result.  Copjec’s interpretation shows the impossibility of either 
resisting or conforming with the Organizational Big Other.   
For Copjec (2004) Creon, the king, is driven by his superego to pursue an ideal that is 
utterly unattainable; he is nostalgic for something he has never possessed.  This lost 
object, Copjec shows, is possession of the place of the Big Other, a place that promises a 
self-assurance that comes from knowing one can dictate what others should do, and the 
correctness of one’s every diktat.  But in seeking utter control over its world the ego has 
to fulfil the desires of an imaginary Other. Those desires must be guessed at but, crucially, 
the masculine position claims to know what they are.  The (masculine) subject who, like 
Creon, places himself in the position of the big Other, of the Law, is then charged with 
upholding the (imagined) desire of this masculine organisation. 
Meanwhile, Antigone gives herself her own law, a law that needs validation from no 
other authority: the Other is non-existent for her (Copjec, 2004, p. 42).   Crucially, 
Antigone has been able to ‘unloose herself from the fundamental law of her own being’ 
(p., 43) through refusing the Symbolic.  This means that she cannot live. Antigone, the 
female position, demonstrates the impossibility of refusing to conform to organisational 
laws – to refuse is to lose one’s identity.  
Applying the Antigone to organizational process theory through a Lacanian lens suggests  
we collectively interpret the symbolic laws of the Organizational Big Other as desiring 
that we become masculine speaking subjects who aggressively pursue the right to dictate 
what others may say and do. If we cannot do this then we are threatened with non-
existence (or reduction to the position of the feminine).   To fulfil the fantasies of what 
the fantasised organization desires of us, we attempt to constitute selves that exhibit the 
harshest, bleakest form of controlling masculinity; and we constitute an organization in 
that very image, one that limits what can be said, thought, done and felt. The discourses 
of the university and the master dominate. In arriving at this conclusion, I too dictate how 
to read Lacan so as to understand organizations.   
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A Lacanian process theory of  ‘the organization’ is therefore an interpretation of how a 
fantasy controls thoughts, deeds and actions. This trans-individual fantasy articulates the 
vulnerability of subjects whose desire for existence and a yearning need to feel whole 
facilitates the emergence of ‘the organization’. However, the masculine object that exists 
in fantasy mitigates against conscious, let alone unconscious, feelings of wholeness.  
But on reading through this draft I know there is something wrong with this text, 
although I cannot put my finger on it at the moment. Now if I tear it up and start again, 
perhaps I can make it better: perhaps I can write that perfect account of how Lacan might 
better help us understand organizations  …… 
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